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I. Introduction
Uncertainty about the supply of inputs has often been given as a reason for vertical upstream integration. For example, Chandler (1969, p. 37) in his discussion of the history of the largest U.S. companies argues that the strategy for vertical integration had come from the desire to have a more certain supply of stocks, raw materials, and other supplies.
In a similar spirit, the transactions cost literature (see, e.g., Coase (1937) , Malmgren (1961) , and Williamson (1971) ) argues that uncertainty can make it difficult to deal in factor markets and thus creates an incentive for vertical upstream integration in order to bypass these problems by transferring goods internally.
Nevertheless, formal analyses on the effects of uncertainty about input supplies as an incentive for vertical upstream integration are rather rare. Arrow (1975) analyzes a model where it is assumed that vertically integrated firms obtain information about the input's supply conditions earlier than non-integrated firms. This information advantage creates a tendency towards complete vertical upstream integration. Green (1986) considers a model where downstream firms face no uncertainty in their product market and sell all of their output at the exogenous market price. The input market is beset by exogenous stochastic demand. Input prices are fixed so that downstream firms may be rationed. To avoid rationing and to internalize the price system, downstream firms tend to fully integrate even though they are (slightly) less efficient than upstream firms. By additionally taking risk attitudes of the traders into account, Hendrikse and Peters (1989) obtain partial vertical integration as an equilibrium markeL structure in a setup in the spirit of Green.
Carlton (1979) analyzes a model where uncertainty from the product market transmits into the input market. Again fixed prices prevail on the input market so that rationing may occur. To rule out full integration, Carlton assumes that an integrated firm cannot sell its input on the market and may, therefore, be stuck with inputs for which it has no use. The equilibrium market structure is characterized by partial vertical upstream integration. Risk averse downstream firms wish to secure their high probability demand.
Closest to our analysis is an interesting paper by Bolton and Whinston (1990) . They consider a setup where a single upstream firm produces an input that is used by two downstream firms. The upstream firm has random capacity so that supplies may be insufficient to meet both downstream firms' needs. As in Grossman and Hart ( 1986), ex ante contracts can only be written about the allocation of ownership over the productive assets. We consider a finite set of downstream firms each of which has a stochastic requirement for a particular input-less in bad times than in good times. Downstream firms either produce the input themselves or purchase it through a Walrasian market from upatream firms that have no market power. Up-and downstream firms have access to the same input technology. 'fo produce the input, a firm has to build up capacity at a fixed cost.
If a firm has a certain capacity level, it can produce any quantity of the input that does not exceed capacity at a constant marginal cost. We assume, as is quite common in the literature (see, e.g., Williamson (1985) ~, that a downstream firm that produces the input itself does not sell it.' Up-and downstream firms simultaneously pick capacity levels.
Nature then determines each downstream firm's input requirement. If a downstream firm's input requirement exceeds its own capacity, it shows up on the input market with positive demand. If market demand exceeds market supply, a high price prevaiLg and vice versa so that the input market clears. Up-and downstream firms aze risk neutral.
To begin with, we show that full integration always constitutes an equilibrium market structure. That is, all downstream firms have a capacity that allows to produce the maximum input requirement in good times and that is paztly idle in bad times. However, this equilibrium is inefficient. Since downstream firms do not sell the input, they cannot pool their input requirements. Risk pooling can only be achieved if the input is produced by upstream firms and traded in the market. For example, the situation where downstream firms do not produce the input at all and purchase their needs on the mazket is more e(ficicnt than thc full integratioi~cquilibriurn. Nevertheless, this non-integration situation never constitutes a market equilibrium. If a downstream firm starts producing some of its own input needs, it cuts down aggregate demand and thus depresses prices in the input market. This favorable price effect outweighs the risk of idle capacity in bad times given that the vertically integrated capacity is not too large. It follows from this result that the input market will always be characterized by vertical upstream integration.
The following two questions then arise: when will we observe an efficient level of partial vertical upstream integration and under which conditions will the input market be characterized by too much vertical integration? The answer to the first question is fairly negative. If the model's parameters happen to be such that upstream firms make expected zero profits, then there exists an equilibrium with an efficient level of partial vertical upstream integration. However, the parameter constellation is unlikely to hold.
Our last result gives sufhcient conditions for too much vertical upstream integration. If the zero profit condition fails to hold and the input requirement in good times is sufficiently high, downstream firms will have an inefficiently high level of vertically integrated capacity.
The favorable effect of depressing market prices outweighs the loss from idle capacity in 4 bad times.
We thus show that although an input market is characterized by flexible prices and no strategic power of upstream firms, downstream firms will always vertically integrate.
Furthermore, the level of vertical upstream integration is often inefficiently high.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model. In section III we derive our results about the equilibrium market structures.
II. The Model
Consider a set of n identical downstream firms indexed by a-1, ..., n. Each downstream firm faces stochastic demand for its output that can either be high or low. To produce the output, downstream firms need a particular input. If demand for its output is low, i.e., in bad times, a firm needs less of the input than in good times. 
oo, otherwise.
We assume that upstream firm 6 chooses capacity y" E{0,1}, b-1, ..., m. Under this assumption upstream firms have no strategic power which in turn makes market exchange 
Let f e (a -e)Pr(i). (2)
Assumption (2) 
III. Market Structure
Let ua now derive mazket structures for our input mazket. We will identify the degree 
where the last inequality follows from assumption (2) . Thus, given Y-0, it is optimal for downstream firms to have capacity ya -i, a-1, ..., n.
Conversely, if all downstream firms have capacity ya -i, aggregate demand D-0.
Upstream firms thus never sell any input. Building up capacity yb -1 yields losses for an 9 upstream firm because it incurs a fixed cost J without obtaining any revenue.
Q.E.D.
The existence of the full integration equilibrium is an immediate consequence of (2).
Assumption (2) says that the probability of good times is sufficiently high so that it is worthwhile to have capacity ya -i. The capacity i is only partly used in bad times. Yet, the cost to forgo some input in good times outweighs the cost of idle capacity in bad times.
However, the full integration equilibrium typically is inefficient. Downstream firms do not sell the input. Accordingly, they cannot pool their input requirements.e Risk pooling can only be achieved if the input is produced by upstream firms and traded in the market.
Typically, such a market structure is more efficient than the full integration equilibrium.
To be more specific, consider an example. Given that the non-integration situation is typically more efficient than the full integration equilibrium, it seems worthwhile to investigate under which conditions the nonintegration situation constitutes an equilibrium. In the next Proposition we will show that the non-integration situation never constitutes a market equilibrium. It followa from this result that in any equilibrium market structure we observe vertical upstream integration. firm 1 decreases the probability of a seller's market coinciding with its own high demand.
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Downstream firm 1 pays the fair expected markup f-(~r -c)~D~Y Pr(D) on the rnarket. Downstream firm 1 needs x for sure and an additional (i -x) when it faces good times. If downstream firm 1 purchases its entire input needs on the mazket, the amount it pays in excess of marginal costs equals (~r -c)x~D~Y Pr(D)~-( n -c)(i -
?)~~n~r n Pr(0) -f x-} (~r -c) (i -x)~eè~Y~Pr(0)
.
Consequently, if downstream firm 1 unilaterally deviates with yl -x, it is strictly better
off and the non-integration situation cannot be an equilibrium.
We have thus shown that we will always observe some vertical upstream integration.
A downstream firm that builds up capacity has to take into account the following effects.
The first unfavorable effect is that building up capacity has a fixed cost f. The second unfavorable effect is that the downstream firm may run the risk of idle capacity. The first favorable effect is that the downstream firm can produce the input itself at marginal cost c. The second favorable effect is that the downstream firm cuts down aggregate demand and may thus decrease the probability that high prices prevail on the input market. 
Now consider a downstream firm that switches from capacity y E
We then havẽ
Pr(D) -~, Pr(D') and
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If downstream firm 1 increases capacity by z, it does not cut down aggregate demand by an amount large enough to change the probability of a glut or the probability of a sellers' market coinciding with its own high demand. This implies 
.,y,.,Y) -Ix t cxPr(x) t ciPr(i) -jy t cxPr(x) t ciPr(i) t(~r -e)(i -y)~D~r Pr(D)Ĩ y t czPr(x) t csPr(i) t(
. , y~, Y) -Í (y -z) t czPr ( x)~-ciPr(i) t (7f-C)(x-y~-z)~e~'~Y n Pr(~I)t(7f-C)(i-ytz)~e À'~]'n Pr(~,)-~---vf.
à~-:-vt.
jy t cxPr(x)~-ciPr(i) t (~r -c)(x -y)~~o,~Yn Pr(0')-ẽ~-
:-Yt: (a -c)(i -y)~~n'~rn Pr(0') -jz t(~r -c)z~n~~r Pr(D~)d~-
s-vt.
K~(yi, -,y~,Y),
where the last inequality follows from the observation that downstream firm 1's switch to y-z increases the probability that high prices prevail. Consequently, downstream firm 1 is strictly worse off by having capacity y, -y-z instead of y, -y.
Q.E.D.
We where the last inequality holds if i is sufficiently lazge.
We have thus shown that we will observe an inefficiently high level of vertical upstream losses. This in turn implies that a downstream firm's switch from y-x to y-x-f 1 is sufficient to decrease the probability of a sellers' mazket.
In terms of our four effects such a deviation impliea the following. The aum of the first unfavorable and the first favorable effects is strictly favorable for a downstream firm.
The mazket charges a price that is too high to recover upstream firms' fixed costs. The second unfavorable effect is strictly unfavorable for a downstream firm. The downstrea.m firm has capacity in excess of x. The excess capacity is idle in bad times. The second favorable effect is strictly favorable. By the switch to y-x i-1, a downstream firm decreases the probability of a sellers' market. This means that it geta the risky pazt of its input requirement i-x cheaper. If~is sufficiently large, the second favorable effect outweighs the second unfavorable effect. Consequently, a downstream firm will deviate with the inefficiently high capacity level y-x-I-1.
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IV. Conclusions
We have thus shown that although an input market is chazuterized by flexible prices and upstream firms have no strategic power, downstream firms will always vertically integrate. If a downstream firm starts producing some of its own input needs, it cuts down aggregate input demand and thus depresses prices in the mazket. This favorable price effect outweighs the risk of idle capacity in bad times given that the vertically integrated capacity is not too large. This result does not hinge on the assumption that downatream firms do not sell the input. Moreover, we have shown that the incentive to depress prices on the input market often leads to an inefficiently high level of vertically integrated capacity.
If we allowed for a dual market structure with downstream firms negotiating advance contracts and spot markets ta.kinn care of random fluctuations, the incentive for vertical upstream integration might disappear. Nevertheless, such a dual mazket structure raises the issue of breach of contract. If high prices prevail on the spot market, upstream firms are tempted to break the advance contract and vice veisa for downstream firms. These problems shed doubt on the conjecture that a dual market structure works smoothly. 2) Alternatively, the reservation price may be interpreted as follows. Let the units of account for the input be normalized such that a downstream firm needs one unit of the input to produce one unit of the output. The price per unit of the output is independent of the demand realization. Then~r is a downstream firms' pro8t per unit of the output plus the cost of one unit of the input.
3) The assumption that input requirements are i.i.d. is made for notational convenience.
All of our results also apply to the case where downstream firms differ in the probability of bad times, i.e., Pr"(x)~Pr.,. (2) , and the input requirements of two firms, respectively, are not perfectly correlated, i.e., cor(ia,io.) E(-1,1), a,a' -1,.. ,n, a~a'. Accordingly, all we need is that the distribution of the states of the world has full support. Note that we do not need this assumption to prove Proposition 2. 
